Costs of trade and self-selection into exporting

and importing: the case of Turkish

manufacturing firms by Dalgic, Basak et al.
Costs of trade and self-selection into exporting and importing: 
the case of Turkish manufacturing firms
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Dalgic, Basak, Fazlioglu, Burcu and Gasiorek, Michael (2015) Costs of trade and self-selection 
into exporting and importing: the case of Turkish manufacturing firms. Economics (15). pp. 1-28. 
ISSN 1864-6042 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/55334/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
Costs of trade and self-selection into exporting
and importing: The case of Turkish
manufacturing rms.
Bas¸ak Dalg¬ç Burcu Fazl¬o¼gluy Michael Gasiorekz
April 2015
Abstract
This paper focuses on self-selection into trade by exporting and import-
ing rms, and on the presence of di¤erential variable and sunk costs between
exporters and importers across di¤erent categories of imports. We use a rich
and recent dataset for Turkish manufacturing rms for the period 2003-10.
This allows us to provide a comprehensive analysis of rm heterogeneity and
the connection between rm-level performance and international trade. We
provide evidence on the remarkable heterogeneity across rms where only-
importers (importers) perform better than only-exporters (exporters). We
detect a self-selection e¤ect for both importing and exporting rms with a
stronger e¤ect for importers. The results suggest that the nature of sunk
costs varies between importing and exporting activities with importers fac-
ing higher sunk costs. Tari¤s represent a potentially important source of
variation in the variable costs of trading. When taking the tari¤s faced
by rms into account, we nd that the self-selection e¤ect associated with
sunk costs is still present but greatly reduced with a smaller reduction for
importers compared to exporters.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the relationship between the self-selection mechanisms asso-
ciated with the trading activities of rms, and the related costs of trade. We focus
on the di¤erentials with regard to self-selection and trading costs between export-
ing and importing activities, and consider the role of both sunk and variable costs
across rms by trading status. The paper uses an extensive data set on the trading
activities of rms in Turkey and in so doing aims to expand the empirical evidence
for developing /emerging countries on rm heterogeneity in international trade.
The international trade literature has witnessed a dramatic change over the
past eighteen years where the focus has switched from the investigation of macro-
level agents to the micro players in trade, and where rm-level heterogeneity has
emerged as a core topic. The microeconometrics of rms engagement in interna-
tional trade was pioneered by Bernard and Jensen (1995), Aw and Hwang (1995)
and Roberts and Tybout (1997). The theoretical framework has been largely stim-
ulated by the seminal works of Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003). With the
availability of rm level datasets a substantial empirical literature has shown that
internationalized rms show superior performance to the rms who serve only the
domestic markets1. The majority of the literature focusses on exports, with much
less attention paid to imports. In particular, there are relatively few studies on
the importing activity and rm-performance nexus for developing countries.
The picture that emerges from this literature suggests that the superior per-
formance of internationalized rms emerges via both self-selection and post-entry
e¤ects. Regarding the latter, exporting rms may become more e¢cient on ex-
porting through learning, or as a result of economies of scale, or via interaction
with foreign clients, and being exposed to more intense competition in interna-
tional markets2. The post-entry mechanisms of importing suggest the possibility
of learning e¤ects through the importing of intermediate and capital goods via
international knowledge spillovers, variety e¤ects and quality e¤ects3.
The self selection hypothesis, which emerges from the theoretical literature,
suggests that (due to the existence of sunk costs and di¤erent productivity levels
within the same industry), only the most productive rms self-select into export
markets. Specically, Melitz (2003) builds his monopolistic competition model on
the assumption that there exist additional costs for rms selling in international
1See Greenaway and Kneller, 2007; Wagner, 2007, 2012 and; Redding, 2010 for surveys of the
empirical evidence.
2For a detailed survey of the learning-by-exporting literature see Silva et al. (2010) and see
Martins and Yang (2009) for a detailed analysis of 33 empirical studies.
3For theoretical models see Grossman and Helpman (1991), Eaton and Kortum (2001),
Acharya and Keller (2007) whereas for empirical evidence see, inter alia, Kasahara and Lapham
(2008), Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2010) and Forlani (2010).
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markets. Only rms surpassing some threshold level of productivity can therefore
make positive prots in international markets. In a related vein, Bernard et al.
(2003) shows that self-selection into exporting occurs also via variable trade costs.
Accordingly, these variable costs can also create self-selection of productive rms
into foreign markets regardless of the presence of any sunk costs. These sunk
and/or variable costs are typically linked to knowledge of markets, transportation,
marketing and advertising, and the setting-up of foreign distribution channels.
Similarly, the self-selection of more productive rms into import markets results
from the existence of xed and/or variable costs of importing, such that only
rms above some productivity threshold import. This enables rms with high
productivity levels to o¤shore some of their production while low productivity
rms limit themselves to sourcing from domestic markets. The nature of import
costs are related to issues such as the search costs for foreign suppliers, inspection
of goods, negotiation, contract formulation, learning and acquisition of customs
procedures. Importers are also likely to face greater informational asymmetries
associated with imperfect monitoring of the purchased goods quality and cost of
transferring the embedded technology (Altomonte and Békés, 2009).
While there is a substantial empirical evidence supporting the self-selection
hypothesis of exporting (see among others Roberts and Tybout,1997; Bernard and
Jensen, 1999; Aw et al., 2000; Bernard and Wagner, 1997; Isgut, 2001, Delgado
et al., 2002); there is much more limited evidence on self-selection into importing
(Vogel and Wagner, 2010; Eriksson et al., 2009; Smeets and Warzynski, 2010;
Altomonte and Békés, 2010), with a small number of recent papers on the possible
heterogeneity across importing and exporting activities (Kasahara and Lapham,
2008; Castellani et al., 2010).
In this paper we utilize the most recently available dataset covering the whole
population of Turkish manufacturing rms with more than 19 employees matched
with rm-level international trade data over the period 2003-2010. Being an emerg-
ing economy for whom trade has been an important driver of growth, our case
constitutes an interesting quasi-natural experiment since our data covers a period
in which Turkey experienced a trade boom and underwent a structural transfor-
mation in terms of its production and trade patterns. The process of integration
of the Turkish economy into the world gained momentum following the Customs
Union with the EU in the late 1990s and the EUs decision to start accession talks
with Turkey in 2004, accompanied by abundant foreign capital inows. Following
a series of macroeconomic and structural reforms, the Turkish economy recovered
relatively quickly from the negative shock of the economic crisis in 2001. We an-
alyze the period after 2002, over which Turkey experiences this recovery and a
dramatic export boom. Over 2002-12 the share of Turkish manufacturing indus-
try in GDP was 23.5 percent on average. With an average share of 80 percent in
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total exports, Turkey is second to only China among the BRIC countries in terms
of the share of manufacturing in exports. Over 2002-12 Turkeys total trade vol-
ume increased by 342 percent with an increase of 325 percent in its exports. This
compares to the average export performance of its peers in the same income group
(Brazil,China, Mexico, and South Africa) whose exports grew by 212 percent.
There are four main contributions of this paper to the literature on trade
and rm heterogeneity. First, in considering the self-selection e¤ects we control
for the importing status of exporting rms and vice versa. This is commonly
neglected in the literature. Such a comparison is crucial for rms operating in the
Turkish manufacturing industry for whom a key characteristic is the dependence on
imported intermediate goods. Secondly, in exploring the role of self-selection e¤ects
we take variable costs (in particular those associated with tari¤s) into account,
and assess the impact of these on the estimated sunk costs. Thirdly, and building
on the literature suggesting a link between productivity and product complexity,
we investigate the di¤erentials between the sunk costs for importing/exporting of
capital, intermediate and consumption goods. Finally, but equally importantly
to the best of our knowledge our paper is the rst attempt to investigate self-
selection for Turkey, and contributes to the very limited literature on self-selection
in importing for less developed countries (see Table 2 of Wagner 2012)4.
Overall, and consistent with previous work, we show that rms that engage in
both sides of trade perform better than those involved only in one side; and that
all types of internationalized rms outperform non-trading rms. The distinction
between exporters and importers provides evidence as to the heterogeneity across
rms, where only-importers (importers) perform better than only-exporters (ex-
porters). We detect a self-selection e¤ect for both importing and exporting rms
with a stronger e¤ect for importers. In contrast with much of the literature which
fails to control for importing status of exporting rms and vice versa, when we
take trading status of rms into account, we nd that the self-selection e¤ect is
still present, but greatly reduced. The reduction is smaller for importers compared
to exporters.
In accounting for sunk costs by means of past-trade experience we show that
the extent and nature of sunk costs varies between importing and exporting activ-
ities, with Turkish manufacturing importers facing higher sunk costs compared to
exporters. In accounting for the variable costs associated with tari¤s we show that
the sunk costs associated with importing and exporting decline, but with a smaller
reduction for importers compared to exporters, hence widening the relative gap
between these two. This identies the importance of variable costs and the need
4Existing empirical analyses of Turkey on rm heterogeneity either focus on post-entry mech-
anisms (Yasar and Rejesus, 2005; Yas¸ar and Paul, 2008; Maggioni, 2012 and Dalg¬ç et al., 2014)
or investigate the role of importing, exporting and the joint involvement in both activities on the
rm product scope and new product introduction (Lo Turco and Maggioni, 2014).
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for more research on this. We also show that the sunk costs are higher for capital
goods, than intermediate and consumption goods for both of trading activities;
and once again with higher sunk costs for importers in terms of each category.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces
the data used in the empirical investigation and gives some descriptive evidence
on trading status dynamics. Section three presents the empirical results. Section
four concludes.
2 Data and Preliminary Evidence
This paper is based on two di¤erent sources of data collected by the Turkish State
Institute of Statistics (TURKSTAT). The rst is The Annual Industry and Service
Statistics and the second is the Annual Trade Statistics.
The Annual Industry and Service Statistics is a census of rms with more than
19 employees, and a representative survey for rms with less than 20 employees.
For this study, we select the whole population of private Turkish manufacturing
rms with 20 employees or more. Such rms account for 87 percent of the value
of production and 75 percent of employment in 2009 of Turkish manufacturing
industry. In the Annual Industry and Service Statistics dataset, rms are clas-
sied according to their main activity, as identied by Eurostats NACE Rev.1.1
standard codes for sectoral classication. The database provides detailed infor-
mation on a number of structural variables such as revenues, value added, labour
cost, intermediate inputs cost, tangible and intangible investment costs together
with information on industry and geographical location, foreign ownership and
the number of employees. We calculate the capital stock series by applying the
perpetual inventory methodology and using the data on investment cost series for
machinery and equipment, building and structure, transportation equipment and
computer and programming. We use two di¤erent measures for rm-level produc-
tivity. One is total factor productivity (TFP)calculated using the Levinsohn and
Petrins (2003) semi-parametric approach. The other is the standard labour pro-
ductivity (LP), dened as value added (gross output net of intermediate inputs)
per employee.
The second source of data we utilize is rm level foreign trade ows, which
are sourced from customs declarations. The import and export ows are collected
for the whole universe of imports and exports at 12-digit GTIP classication (the
rst 8 digits of which correspond to the CN classication whereas the last 4 digits
are country specic). Information on the origin/destination countries of the trade
ows is also available in the dataset. In order to conduct our analysis we merge
the above two datasets. Our unbalanced panel covers longitudinal data of 38223
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rms over the period 2003-20105. The original sample size in the merged dataset
was slightly larger but we applied a cleaning procedure largely inspired by Hall
and Mairesse (1995).
In order to explore the linkages between rm characteristics and the interna-
tionalization status of rms we rst classify the rms according to their trading
status. We dene rms serving only the domestic market as non-traders; rms
engaged in exporting activities (including those that only export and those that
not only export but also import) as exporters; rms engaged in importing activ-
ities (including those that only import and those that combine their imports with
exporting activities) as importers; rms that do not export or import separately
but are simultaneously involved in exporting and importing activities as two-way
traders. We also dene only-exporters and only-importers.
In Table 1a, we provide descriptive evidence on our manufacturing industry
panel, di¤erentiating between rms according to their participation in foreign mar-
kets. From the rst column we can see that over 2003-2010, on average 63.3 percent
of all rms are internationalized. Two-way traders, representing just over 39 per-
cent of the sample, constitute the largest share of internationalized rms, while
rms that engage in only exporting (10.8 percent) or only importing (13.3 per-
cent) are a minority. Exporting rms constitute 50 percent of the panel whereas
importing rms share is slightly higher at 52 percent.
Tables 1a and 1b report on how many rms changed their status over the
period of analysis. According to Table 1a, the distribution of rms according to
trading status stays fairly constant. For instance, the share of only-exporters stays
in a range between 8.5-12 percent while the share of importers stays in a range
between 12.1-14 percent. Column four of Table 1a shows that two-way traders are
the group most likely to preserve their status. There is also quite a lot of churning
in terms of entry and exit. The share of entrants in 2010 with respect to 2003 is
94.5 percent. The share of entrants is highest in the only-exporters category, while
the smallest share of entry was realized by only-importers. Firms that were active
in 2003 but not in 2010 (i.e. exiting rms/deaths) are evident in all categories
with a share of 51.8 percent in total. The group with the largest share of exits are
non-trading rms. This is consistent with the theoretical and empirical view that
non-traders are at the bottom end of the productivity distribution. Consistently,
the smallest share of deaths is realized by rms engaging in both sides of the trading
activities which are also shown to be at the top end of the productivity distribution.
Additionally, the rate of exits is higher for only-exporting rms compared to only-
importers (49.4 percent for only-exporters vs. 43.6 percent for the latter). This
might be attributable to higher productivity thresholds for only-importers relative
to those of only-exporters, and for which we provide evidence later in this paper.
5See Online Appendix for the evolution of the sample over the analysis period.
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According to Table 1b, movements of rms between trading categories also shows
signicant variation. We observe that it is easier for only-importers to switch to
two-way trading with respect to only-exporters. Moreover, starting to trade as a
two-way trader is a rare event for a non-trader whereas stopping to trade for a
two-way trader is the least likely outcome.
Insert Table 1a here:
Insert Table 1b here:
Consistent with the existing literature our data conrm that (i) trade is more
concentrated than employment and sales; (ii) a high percentage of export volume
is performed by a small number of rms which are very diversied in terms of
products and destination countries (see Online Appendix for a detailed analysis of
concentration of trade in Turkey).
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Do internationalized rms perform better?
In this part of the paper, starting with Table 2 we identify some stylized facts
regarding the performance of internationalised rms. These are in line with the
picture that emerged from the literature reviewed earlier. We show a clear ranking
of rm types by performance from two-way traders to importers and then to ex-
porters. In particular, we nd that non-traders are less productive, are less capital
intensive, smaller in terms of number of employees and sales and pay lower wages.
Conversely two-way traders are the most productive and capital intensive, have
the largest numbers of employees, and pay the highest wages.
Insert Table 2 here:
Next, we explore the productivity premia between non-traders and trading
rms while controlling for other factors that could also impact on performance. For
instance, it is well established that larger rms are on average more productive than
smaller rms, or that foreign a¢liated rms are on average more productive than
rms that only serve the domestic market. Similarly, two-way traders are typically
found to be larger and have a higher levels of foreign participation than non-
traders. To control for these factors in understanding the performance di¤erentials
between rms, and following Bernard and Jensen (1999) and several other studies,
we explore the relationship between rm level characteristics and international
trading status with the following regression:
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yit =  + 1D
two way
it + 2D
only imp
it + 3D
only exp
it + Controls+ "it (1)
Where the subscript i denotes individual rms and t indexes year. The depen-
dent variable yit measures the logarithm either of rms labor productivity (LP) or
total factor productivity (TFP). Dummy variables for trading status are denoted
by Dtwo wayit ; D
only imp
it and D
only exp
it , respectively. We utilize a series of control
variables denoted by a vector of controls including the logarithm of rms employ-
ment, capital intensity and wage per employee as a proxy of skill intensity, as well
as two-digit sector, region and year dummies6. We also include a foreign a¢liation
dummy where the foreign capital share is greater than zero. The coe¢cients 1;
2 and 3 in front of the trading dummies in equation (1) reveal the average trad-
ing premia in terms of productivity. The traders premia can then be computed
from the estimated coe¢cients as 100(exp() 1), showing the average percentage
di¤erence in productivity between a rm in one of the three respective groups of
trading rms, and the non-trading rms, while controlling for the characteristics
included in the vector of controls.
The results from the pooled OLS regressions and FE regressions are reported
in Table 3. For each of these, in the rst column we give the results for a stan-
dard OLS regression; in the second column, and in order to deal with unobserved
aspects of rm-level heterogeneity, we include rm specic time invariant xed
e¤ects; and in the nal column we give the results for a dynamic FE model. Sup-
porting the descriptive evidence above, the trade premia in terms of productivity
are of considerable magnitude and statistically signicant. Specically, interna-
tionalized rms have higher productivity levels than non-trading rms even after
controlling for size, capital and skill intensity, region, sector and time e¤ects. The
magnitude of the trade premia coe¢cient declines signicantly in the FE specica-
tions pointing to the role of unobserved heterogeneity and the importance of rm
specic factors. For instance, in terms of TFP in the OLS specication two-way
traders are estimated to be 51 percent more productive than non-internationalized
rms, while in the FE model this premium reduces to 14 percent.
In both the OLS and FE specications, two-way traders have the highest premia
followed by rms that only import, while rms that only export have the small-
est estimated premia. Note that the hierarchy suggesting that two-way traders
perform best followed by only-importers, and then only-exporters and nally non-
traders remains after the inclusion of time invariant xed e¤ects into the equation
(1)7. This performance ordering of rms is in line with other empirical work using
6The region dummies identify 12 Turkish regions distrubuted according to the NUTS2 clas-
sication.
7In order to compare the coe¢cients within each regression, we have performed the Wald
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this workhorse model (Muuls and Pisu, 2009; Serti and Tomasi, 2009; Altomonte
and Békés, 2009; Silva et al.,2012; Castellini et al., 2010) with the exception of
McCann (2009) and Vogel and Wagner (2010)8. The fact that importers are more
productive than exporters can be attributed two di¤erent but not mutually ex-
clusive explanations. The rst is to do with self-selection e¤ects and associated
sunk/xed costs; and the second is to do with the possible impact of importing
on productivity. Indeed, regarding the latter Dalg¬ç et al. (2014) show that im-
porting has a greater impact on productivity compared to exporting in Turkish
manufacturing industry.
Regarding the former, advocates of self-selection suggest that only more pro-
ductive rms will be able to import due to the presence of xed costs of import-
ing. That the evidence from both the descriptive statistics and regressions suggest
higher performance premia for only-importers (importers) than only-exporters (ex-
porters), reinforces the idea of a stronger self-selection mechanism associated with
importing at work with respect to exporting. In turn this may be driven by higher
xed costs associated with importing, in comparison to exporting. In the next
section we therefore turn to analyzing the existence of self selection mechanisms
with a special focus on the question of whether a stronger mechanism is at work for
importing activities in comparison to exporting in Turkish manufacturing industry.
Insert Table 3 here:
Note that, so far the analysis should be largely seen as providing correla-
tions/associations between rm performance and international trade engagement
as opposed to unequivocally showing causality. The existing literature frequently
fails to employ dynamic specications in order to address issues of endogeneity9.
Hence, in order to shed light on possible endogeneity associated with the FE re-
gressions, we test a dynamic specication, and this also serves as a robustness
check. We run a series of xed e¤ects regressions in which we incorporate the
lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor. Including the lagged depen-
dent variable may produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates because
of its correlation with the individual specic e¤ects. While in such cases, GMM
estimators are generally used (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002), in large
samples as ours the standard results for the dynamic model indicate that the OLS
levels estimator is biased upward, while the within-group estimator is biased down-
ward (Bond, 2002; Bernard and Jensen, 2004). We report on the FE estimates
test of the di¤erence between the coe¢cients on only-export and only-import dummies. Our
F-statistics are highly signicant rejecting the hypothesis that the two coe¢cients are equal.
8McCann (2009) working with data for Irish rms, and Vogel and Wagner (2010) on data for
East and West Germany nd that only exporting rms out-perform only importing rms.
9Silva et al.(2013) is the only study that employs such a dynamic specication in this context.
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with lagged dependent variables for equation (1) in Table 3. The results from
the dynamic specications are consistent with our previous nding indicating the
positive correlation between rm productivity and trade engagement as well as the
clear pattern of performance ordering among the types of internationalization sta-
tus. Further, the signicant coe¢cient of the lagged dependent variables in these
regressions conrms that a rms performance history a¤ects its current position.
3.2 Self-Selection & Sunk Costs: Exporting vs Importing
Evidence from Tables 1a and 1b demonstrated a substantial number of rms
switching their internationalization status. This variation in our data signals the
importance of identifying the self-selection mechanisms at work. In addition, in
Table 1a we observe a more persistent behavior for importing rms with respect to
exporters and, in Table 1b we observe that a higher percentage of importers switch
to two-way trading than is the case for exporters. This may suggest higher sunk
costs for importing with respect to exporting in Turkey. We therefore proceed by
shedding light on whether rms self select into trade and whether this e¤ect is
stronger for importing and nally consider the driving forces behind this.
We start with addressing the question whether being a trader is associated with
rms ex-ante superior performance. If more productive rms become traders then
we should expect to nd signicant di¤erences in productivity between future trade
starters and future non-starters several years before entry. In order to do so, we
dene an only-export-starter as a rm which had never traded in the previous
two years (t   2 & t   1) and starts to exporting-only in year t. In this way, we
can compare rms which did not trade internationally in years t  2 & t  1 and
start to export in year t with rms that did not trade at all. Only-import-starters
and two-way-starters are dened similarly. We thus have six cohorts and each
corresponds to a year between 2005 and 2010. To explore the pre-entry di¤erences
in productivity between trade-starters and non-traders, we estimate the following
equation with the usual controls:
yit  = 0 + i + 1D
Starter
i + Controlst  + "it; with 1    2: (2)
where DStarteri is a dummy variable taking value one if the rm is a starter
and zero if the rm is always a non-trader. The results are reported in Table 4,
where we consider the premia with regard to both labour productivity and total
factor productivity. The coe¢cients show the average percentage performance
di¤erential at t   2 between starters at t and rms with no international trade
activity over the whole period. Overall, and in line with previous studies we nd a
self-selection e¤ect for both importing and exporting rms. Specically, the results
conrm that internationalized rms are ex-ante more productive than non-traders.
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The productivity premia is highest for two-way starters, and this applies both to
labour productivity and total factor productivity.
Note also that, the pre-entry levels of the productivity indicators are larger
for only-import starters than those of only-export starters. For instance, two
years before entering the import market, import starters are 31.9 percent more
productive, in terms of TFP, and 26.6 percent in terms of labour productivity
than always non-traders, while the corresponding gures for export starters are
28.3 percent and 20.4 percent. The di¤erentials are even greater when looking at
one year before entry (36.8 percent and 36.9 percent for importers with respect to
TFP and labour productivity, and 29.1 percent and 21.1 percent for exporters).
This suggests that importing-only rms exhibit ex-ante performance advantages
with respect to those that export-only, in turn indicating a stronger self-selection
for importing than exporting10.
Insert Table 4 here:
Failing to control for the importing status of exporting rms and vice versa
might lead to overstating the role of self-selection in exporting and importing re-
spectively. Thus, we further investigate the productivity premia of future two-way
traders compared to future only-exporters and future only-importers. In this way,
we account for importers that start to export by comparing rms that imported
but not exported in years t  2 and t  1 and start to export in t with rms that
always imported but not exported at all. Similarly, we investigate the productivity
premia of exporters that start to import. This can be seen in the last four columns
of Table 4 where, analogously to before, the coe¢cients show the average percent-
age productivity di¤erence at t   2; between only-exporters that start to import
at t (only-importers that start to export at t) and only-exporters (only-importers)
that do not start to import at all. We nd that when taking into account the
importing status of export starters, the performance premium of export starters is
still present but greatly reduced. The premium is 6.7 percent with respect to TFP
and 7.4 percent with regard to labour productivity. Similarly, the productivity
premium of import starters goes down, but by considerably, and is 21.8 percent
with respect to TFP, and 24.7 percent with regard to labour productivity.
Hence, taking into account the importing (exporting) status of exporters (im-
porters) respectively serves to accentuate the higher productivity associated with
10To provide an alternative approach, instead of estimating equation 2 and comparing the
coe¢cients on only-export and only-import starters, we estimate a version of equation 2 for
exporters and importers using the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions methodology. We test for
the equivalence of the coe¢cients on export/import dummies, and the results indicate that they
are statistically di¤erent. See Online Appendix for details.
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importing in contrast to exporting rms. In addition, these ndings indicate that
the initial pre-entry premia reported in Table 4 may overstate the extent to which
export and import starters have higher initial productivity levels. We therefore
conclude that for Turkish manufacturing rms the self-selection e¤ect is evident in
both exporting and importing activities but is stronger with respect to importing.
A limited number of studies control for the importing status of exporting rms or
vice versa in investigating self-selection e¤ect associated with entering into foreign
markets. Following a similar analysis and using Hungarian data, Altomonte and
Békés (2009) also nd that ex-ante productivity of importing is larger than that
of exporting.
A stronger self selection e¤ect at work for import starters compared to export
starters might suggest higher sunk costs of importing. Accordingly, we shed some
light on the di¤erentials between the sunk costs of importing and exporting. In
order to do so, we estimate three dynamic models for rms that only-export,
only-import and those involved in both activities. Following Roberts and Tybout
(1997), Bernard and Jensen (2004) and Muûls and Pisu (2009), we interpret the
coe¢cient of the lagged dependent variable as a measure of the importance of
sunk costs. The rationale behind our interpretation is that sunk costs generate
hysteresis in export (import) market participation thus we account for sunk costs
by means of past trade experience. We estimate the following random e¤ects
panel probit regression where we include lagged TFP, and number of employees as
rm-level performance controls:
P (yit = 1; xit; yit 1; ui) = f( + yit 1 + 
0xit + ui) (3)
Subscript i and index t denotes the individual rms and years, respectively.
The binary variable yit indicates whether the rm is a trader or not in one of three
subsequent forms (exporting-only, importing-only or being a two way trader); x
consists of our rm level performance controls including the mean of these controls
as well as region, sector and year dummies; ui captures the rm level unobservables
where f denotes the cumulative normal distribution and where ui can be expressed
as 11:
ui = o + 1yi0 + 2xi + i (4)
The results of the random e¤ects dynamic probit model are presented in Panel
A of Table 5. As is standard in the literature, we conrm that the more productive
11In order to deal with the initial condition bias existing in dynamic limited dependent variable
models and the possible correlation between the controls and unobserved heterogeneity we utilize
Wooldridges (2005) methodology which models rm specic e¤ects ui as a function of the initial
condition and other explanatory variables. Accordingly, the model becomes a random e¤ects
probit model.
12
the rms are, the more likely they are to self select into trade. Looking at the
coe¢cients on the lagged dependent variables, we nd that Turkish rms face
sunk costs of engaging into international markets and the nature of these sunk
costs varies between importing and exporting activities12. Specically, we see that
the coe¢cient associated with the lagged import status is higher than exporter
coe¢cient. This suggests that the sunk costs of importing-only are higher than
the sunk costs of exporting-only for Turkish manufacturing rms.
Insert Table 5 here
It is also possible that self-selection mechanisms may be linked to variable costs
of trade. As in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Bernard et al. (2003) higher vari-
able costs of trading also mean only more productive rms will be able to enter
into trade markets. That is they present di¤erent selection mechanisms based on
variable trade costs instead of sunk costs of trading. In their model setting, mar-
ket size and variable costs determine the toughness of competition and hence the
strength of the self-selection e¤ect. Data from the World Bank Doing Business
Surveys suggests that there are indeed higher costs of importing for Turkey. Ex-
porting a standard container of goods requires larger number of documents, takes
more time and costs higher for an importing rm than with respect to those of
exporting for Turkish rms13. Such data is not available neither at the product or
bilateral levels hence making it impossible to include such information as a vari-
able in our regressions. However, another key variable cost are the tari¤s faced
by the rms both with regard to importing and in export markets. In order to
control for the variable costs of trading we re-run the dynamic probit regressions
in Panel B of Table 5 including import and export tari¤s as additional controls.
In calculating the rm level tari¤s, we use import and export tari¤s at HS6 digit
product category from WITS-Trains database. We then calculate rm level tari¤s
by weighting each product-country level (e.g. export line) tari¤ rate with the share
of that product in the total exports of the rm. In this way, we get an average
tari¤ rate which is specic to each rm.
The results in Panel B of Table 5 reinforces our previous nding that there is a
stronger self-selection e¤ect for importers than exporters, and with the strongest
e¤ect for two-way traders. We see that when we control for tari¤s, the coe¢cients
representing the sunk costs for exporting and importing shrink to 0.878 and 0.949
from 0.921 and 0.959, respectively; and that the biggest reduction takes place with
12The initial trade status coe¢cients are high in magnitude and statistically signicant cor-
recting for the bias introduced by the initial condition problem.
13The data suggests that exporting a standard container of goods requires 7 documents, takes
13 days and costs $990. Importing the same container of goods requires 8 documents, takes 14
days and costs $1063 in 2010. Over 2005-2012, the period in which the data is available, one can
see that cost of importing in all dimensions is higher that that of exporting for Turkey.
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regard to exporters. This suggests that the tari¤-related variable cost element is a
more important component of the forces driving self-selection e¤ect for exporters
than with respect to importers. However, in addition, now the sunk costs of
importing-only become relatively higher than previously in comparison to the sunk
costs of exporting-only. Hence failing to consider the variable costs of trade may
underestimate the sunk cost di¤erences between importers and exporters.
Next, and given the previous nding that importing is associated with higher
sunk costs we try and shed more light on the sunk costs that rms might face while
selecting into trade markets. Altomonte and Békés (2010) argue that importers
face uncertainty in their trading relationships (e.g. with regard to the quality
of the product). This uncertainty is likely to be higher the more complex is the
good being traded; therefore the xed costs of trading are likely to be higher
for more complex goods. They show that importers are more productive than
exporters and associate this with higher import complexity. One way of looking
at the di¤erent types of goods and at the complexity of goods is to classify them
according to their nal use. Therefore, we utilize United Nations Classication
by Broad Economic Categories (BEC) and dene products traded in three broad
categories as: consumption goods, intermediate goods and capital goods. Capital
goods (e.g. machinery) are frequently more complex and may require after-sales
service etc. with respect to other categories (Keller and Yeaple, 2008).
The descriptive evidence for Turkey reveals that the share of capital goods im-
ports in total imports is higher compared to capital goods exports in total export.
Thus Turkish imports seem to be more complex than exports. We distinguish
between three types of rms: capital goods importers/exporters; intermediate
goods importers/exporters and consumption goods importers/exporters. An only-
importer (only-exporter) rm is dened to be capital goods importer (exporter) if
the share of capital goods imports (exports) in its total value of imports (exports)
is equal to or greater than 0:5. We dene the other categories similarly.
Table 6 presents the random e¤ects dynamic probit regressions run with these
categories of rms in question. Given the importance of including the variable
cost element associated with tari¤s, all these regressions include the import and
export tari¤s faced by each rm. We show that the sunk costs are higher for
capital goods, than intermediate goods, followed by consumption goods, and this
applies to both importers and exporters. The coe¢cient of the lagged dependent
variable associated with sunk costs of importing-only are 0.974, 0.923 and 0.831
for capital, intermediate and consumption goods importers respectively. While,
the coe¢cients associated with the sunk costs of exporting-only are 0.919, 0.914
and 0.821 for capital, intermediate and consumption goods importers respectively.
Note, rst, that in each case these coe¢cients are higher for importers with respect
to those for exporters. Second, that the di¤erential is the largest with regard to
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capital goods. Once again these results reinforce our previous nding that sunk
costs, to the extent that they drive self-selection, are more important in the case
of importing than exporting in Turkey. As the sunk costs of capital goods are
higher, this also lends support to the notion that this arises because of the higher
complexity associated with such imports (as in Altomonte and Békés (2010)).
Insert Table 6 here
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper uses a rich and recent dataset for Turkish manufacturing rms from
2003 to 2010 to provide the rst comprehensive analysis of rm heterogeneity
connecting rms performance to international trade. More importantly, we inves-
tigate self selection into foreign markets systematially for Turkey, with a particular
focus on the di¤erential between importing and exporting with regard to the self-
selection e¤ect, and the role of variable and sunk costs in importing and exporting.
Overall, in line with the picture emerging from the existing literature we show
a clear ranking of rm types by performance from two-way traders to importers-
only and then to exporters-only. The evidence suggests higher performance premia
for only-importers (importers) than only-exporters(exporters), which in turn im-
plies a stronger self-selection mechanism associated with importing with respect
to exporting. Indeed, we conrm the self-selection e¤ect for both importing and
exporting rms with a stronger e¤ect for importers in Turkey.
In so doing so we show that: (i) being a trader is associated with rms ex-ante
superior performance; (ii) the pre-entry levels of rms productivity are larger for
only-importers than those of only-exporters; (iii) the self-selection e¤ect is still
present but is somewhat reduced with a smaller reduction for importers compared
to exporters after controlling for the importing status of exporting rms and vice
versa; (iv) the nature of sunk costs varies between importing and exporting activ-
ities with importers facing higher sunk costs.
We also show that the self-selection mechanism is associated with both variable
and sunk costs. In particular, if we take the tari¤ related variable costs of trade
into account, we nd that the relative sunk costs for importing are even higher
than for exporting. We further show that the sunk costs are highest for capital
goods, than intermediate and consumption goods for both of trading activities,
with higher sunk costs for importers in terms of each category. These results
suggest the importance of further research exploring the determinants of both
sunk and variable costs in trade, and the di¤erential costs which are likely to be
present between importers and exporters.
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Tables: 
TABLE 1a 
Trade Participation and Employment Rates by Trade Status 
             
 
 Percentage of Firms 
  
2003-2010 2003 2010 Same Status Exit Entry 
Non-Traders 36.7 40 38.23 16.7 72.3 111.7 
Only-Exporters 10.8 8.53 11.98 16.3 49.4 148.5 
Only-Importers 13.3 13.99 12.1 18.2 43.6 75.4 
Two-way 
Traders 39.2 37.5 37.69 53.2 33.6 70.8 
Total      30.5 51.8 94.5 
 
   TABLE 1b 
Transition of Firms Between Trading Categories (2003-2010) 
  2003 
Start 
Trading 
Stop 
Trading Switch 2010 
Non-Traders 100 11.0 7.9 
 
136.4 
Only-Exporters 100 13.9 9.9 24.4 200.4 
Only-Importers 100 9.3 9.2 29.0 123.3 
Two-way Traders 100 5.1 2.8 10.4 143.3 
Total 100       142.6 
 Notes: The Table 1b gives percentage of firms according to 2003 values. Columns 2,3 
and 4 report the switches of continuing firms in and out of each status The movements 
between non-traders and the three types of traders are reported in column 2 and 3, while 
in column 4 we report those traders that switch trading status. 
 
TABLE 2 
 Firm Performance According to Trade Status (2003-2010) 
  LP TFP Employee Capint Wage_L 
Exporters 10.16 7.76 138.89 10.83 8.79 
Importers 10.24 7.83 144.23 10.91 8.82 
TW traders 10.29 7.87 164.06 10.96 8.86 
Non-traders 9.49 7.17 48.93 9.97 8.51 
Only-Exporters 9.67 7.35 47 10.34 8.53 
Only-Importers 10.07 7.69 85.18 10.79 8.68 
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TABLE 3 
Trade Premia Regressions (2003-2010) 
 
  
            
LP TFP 
  
Pooled 
Regression FE 
Dynamic 
FE 
Pooled 
Regression FE 
Dynamic 
FE 
Two-way trader dummy 0.591*** 0.131*** 0.117*** 0.401*** 0.131*** 0.116*** 
(0.00621) (0.00973) (0.0106) (0.00641) (0.00977) (0.0106) 
Only-export dummy 0.144*** 0.0716*** 0.0607*** 0.0801*** 0.0725*** 0.0606*** 
(0.00739) (0.00972) (0.0106) (0.00764) (0.00977) (0.0106) 
Only-import dummy 0.429*** 0.0799*** 0.0787*** 0.323*** 0.0775*** 0.0730*** 
(0.00744) (0.00948) (0.0102) (0.00764) (0.00952) (0.0102) 
Observations 111619 111619 85422 111619 111619 85422 
R-squared 0.393 0.063 0.070 0.812 0.059 0.054 
Notes: Reported are the estimated regression coefficients and the robust standard errors (in parentheses) from estimations of the dependent variables as labor 
productivity (LP) and total factor productivity (TFP) at time t respectively. Asterisks denote significance levels (***: p < 1%;**: p<5%; *:p<10%). All 
regressions include region, sector, foreign affiliation and year dummies as well as  capital intensity (Capint), wages per employee (Wage_L ) and  logarithm of 
firms’ number of employees as controls. Dynamic FE regressions include lagged dependent variables.  All dependent variables are in natural logarithms. 
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TABLE 4 
Ex-ante Performance Differentials of Trade Starters 
           
  LP 
  (t-2) (t-1) (t-2) (t-1) (t-2) (t-1) (t-2) (t-1) (t-2) (t-1) 
Non-trader that starts to export in t (dummy) 0.186*** 0.191*** 
        
 
(0.0259) (0.0253) 
        Non-trader that starts to import in t (dummy) 
  
0.236*** 0.314*** 
      
 
  
(0.0447) (0.0430) 
      Non-trader that start to two-way trade 
    
0.364*** 0.415*** 
    
 
    
(0.0270) (0.0255) 
    Importer that starts to export in t (dummy) 
      
0.071** 0.106*** 
  
 
      
(0.0295) (0.0315) 
  Exporter that starts to import in t (dummy) 
        
0.221*** 0.281*** 
 
        
(0.0299) (0.0292) 
Observations 10070 12664 10263 12866 9551 12157 2549 2854 1784 2119 
R-squared 0.241 0.251 0.253 0.268 0.246 0.257 0.243 0.265 0.207 0.258 
  TFP 
  (t-2) (t-1) (t-2) (t-1) (t-2) (t-1) (t-2) (t-1) (t-2) (t-1) 
Non-trader that starts to export in t (dummy) 0.249*** 0.255*** 
        
 
(0.0591) (0.0597) 
        Non-trader that starts to import in t (dummy) 
  
0.277*** 0.313*** 
      
 
  
(0.0461) (0.0457) 
      Non-trader that start to two-way trade 
    
0.325*** 0.444*** 
    
 
    
(0.0964) (0.0906) 
    Importer that starts to export in t (dummy) 
      
0.065** 0.104*** 
  
 
      
(0.0319) (0.0235) 
  Exporter that starts to import in t (dummy) 
        
0.197*** 0.251** 
 
        
(0.0706) (0.0689) 
Observations 10070 12664 10263 12866 9551 12157 2549 2854 1784 2119 
R-squared 0.125 0.116 0.130 0.117 0.129 0.118 0.138 0.145 0.181 0.187 
Notes: Reported are the estimated regression coefficients and the robust standard errors (in parentheses) from estimations of the dependent variables as labor productivity (LP) and total factor productivity 
(TFP) at time t-2 and t-1 respectively. Asterisks denote significance levels (***: p < 1%;**: p<5%; *:p<10%). All regressions include region, sector, foreign affiliation and year dummies as well as  lagged 
values of capital intensity (Capint), wages per employee (Wage_L ) and  logarithm of firms’ number of employees as controls.  All dependent variables are in natural logarithms. 
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TABLE 5 
 
 Dynamic Panel Probit Regressions  
 
 
Panel A(without tariffs) Panel B(with tariffs) 
  
Only-
exporter 
Only-
importer 
Two-way 
trader 
Only-
exporter 
Only-
importer 
Two-way 
trader 
   
  
   Only-export dummy(t-1) 0.921*** 
 
  0.878*** 
  
 
(0.0269) 
 
  (0.0260) 
  Only-import dummy(t-1) 
 
0.959***   
 
0.949*** 
 
  
(0.0225)   
 
(0.0223) 
 Two-way trader dummy(t-1) 
  
1.072*** 
  
1.055*** 
   
(0.0217) 
  
(0.0211) 
Employee(t-1) 0.0889** 0.0925** 0.112** 0.0855** 0.0997** 0.115*** 
 
(0.0371) (0.0475) (0.0451) (0.0442) (0.0464) (0.044) 
TFP(t-1) 0.0215*** 0.0348*** 0.0416*** 0.0268*** 0.0335*** 0.0483*** 
 
(0.0067) (0.0048) (0.0138) (0.005) (0.0043) (0.0134) 
Wage_L(t-1) 0.0100 0.0203** 0.0603* 0.0109  0.0174*** 0.0604** 
 
(0.0449) (0.0083) (0.0364) (0.0424) (0.0057) (0.0354) 
Observations 85412 85412 85412 85412 85412 85412 
       Notes: The table reports dynamic panel probit regressions. (t − 1) indicates that the variable is lagged. Reported are the 
estimated regression coefficients and the robust standard errors (in parentheses) from estimations of the dependent variables 
as binary outcome variables of being an only exporter, only importer and two way trader respectively. Asterisks denote 
significance levels (***: p < 1%;**: p<5%; *:p<10%). All regressions include means of the continuous explanatory variables 
and initial values of the dependent variables as well as region, sector, foreign affiliation and year dummies as controls.  
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TABLE 6 
Dynamic Probit Regressions w.r.to BEC Classification 
 
Notes: The table reports dynamic panel probit regressions. (t − 1) indicates that the variable is lagged. Reported are the 
estimated regression coefficients and the robust standard errors (in parentheses) from estimations of the dependent variables 
as binary outcome variables of being an only exporter, only importer and two way trader respectively. Asterisks denote 
significance levels (***: p < 1%;**: p<5%; *:p<10%). All regressions include means of the continuous explanatory variables 
and initial values of the dependent variables as well as region, sector, foreign affiliation and year dummies as controls.  
 
  WITH TARIFFS 
  
Capital 
Exporter 
Only 
Intermediate 
Exporter Only 
Consumption 
Exporter Only 
Capital 
Importer 
Only 
Intermediate 
Importer Only 
Consumption 
Importer Only 
      
  
Capital Exporter Only (t-1) 0.919*** 
     
 
(0.0387) 
     
Intermediate Exporter Only (t-1) 
 
0.914*** 
    
  
(0.0248) 
    
Consumption Exporter Only (t-1) 
  
0.820*** 
   
   
(0.0396) 
   
Capital Importer Only (t-1) 
   
0.974*** 
  
    
(0.0387) 
  
Intermediate Importer Only (t-1) 
    
0.923*** 
 
     
(0.0277) 
 
Consumption Importer Only (t-1) 
     
0.831*** 
      
(0.0737) 
Observations 82869 83105 83278 82696 83278 83278 
